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Pre 1994: Focus on political unrest
The 1960s in South Africa were notable for the
absence of riot control units. According to Rauch
and Storey this can be attributed to the banning of
political parties and the imprisonment of political
leaders.3 As a result there were fewer public
protests against the apartheid regime, which
reduced the need for these units. When problems
did arise, local police members, together with the
military, were tasked to control the unrest. With no
specialised police training or units, the
consequences were dire when violence did break
out at public events. 
The 1970s saw the revival of the resistance
movement against the state, necessitating the South
African Police (SAP) to develop its riot control
capacity. By the 1980s the SAP had formed a
somewhat established riot control unit that focused
on averting and restraining crowds. 
The early 1990s saw an increase in political activity
in South Africa, which brought many challenges for
the riot control units. The various marches and
rallies that characterised the era could not be
managed as was done previously. After several
incidents, such as those at Sebokeng in 1990 and
Daveyton in 1991, the government realised that the
South Africa’s transition to democracy in 1994brought about many changes. For policing,this meant transforming from repressive
apartheid-style policing to a police service willing
to serve the people. Given the role played by the
Internal Stability Units (ISUs) under the previous
government, these units were in need of a major
overhaul. Their central function at that time was
“the enforcement of apartheid laws, the suppression
of political unrest and the prevention of unrest,
intimidation and unrest-related crimes”.1
This article provides a brief update on the status of
the public order police units after 1994.2 The units
have undergone many changes over the years to
accommodate the demands of the times. Initially
the apartheid stigma needed to be expunged. More
recently, the growing number and intensity of
service delivery protests and riots, and the poor
handling of some of these events, have highlighted
the need to reassess the effectiveness of our public
order policing capacity. 
In their current form – the Area Crime Combating
Units (ACCUs) – the key question is whether South
Africa has the capacity to manage public events and
protest marches, particularly when they are
accompanied by violence or the threat of violence. 
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CROWD CONTROL
Can our public order
police still deliver?
From the heavy-handed crowd control under apartheid to the abusive actions of the Internal Stability Division
during the early 1990s, public order policing in South Africa has been steeped in controversy. However, things
changed after 1994 when this component of the police was radically transformed. With a decline in demand
for their specialised services, and a need for more resources, the units have been reorganised into Area Crime
Combating Units (ACCUs). While no doubt helping to reduce crime, it is unclear whether the SAPS still has
the capacity to manage the increasing number of volatile crowd situations.
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role and function of the riot control units in
perpetrating violence had to be addressed. 
A National Peace Convention was held on 14
September 1991, resulting in the National Peace
Accord, “the purpose of which was to bring an end
to political violence in [the] country and to set out
the codes of conduct, procedures and mechanisms to
achieve this goal”.4 The signatories to the Accord had
to agree to a code of conduct for political parties and
organisations, as well as for police officials –
something that up to this point was absent in the
police. Chapter 6 of the Accord addressed the issue
of public gatherings.5 It called for a commission of
enquiry into the prevention of violence and
intimidation. 
As established by the Prevention of Public Violence
and Intimidation Act of 1991, the purpose of the
Commission was “to investigate and expose the
background and reasons for violence, thereby
reducing the incidence of violence and
intimidation”.6 The Goldstone Commission was
tasked with this investigation in October 1991. The
objectives of the Commission were to:
• inquire into the phenomenon of public violence 
and intimidation in the Republic, the nature and
causes thereof, and what persons were involved
therein; 
• inquire into any steps that should be taken in 
order to prevent public violence and intimidation;
• make recommendations to the State President in 
respect of public violence or intimidation.7
In the interim, the SAP management had decided that
the police and the army (which had been providing
limited assistance in dealing with public unrest),
needed to concentrate on their primary functions,
namely crime prevention and defence respectively.
This led to the formation of the Internal Stability
Division (ISD) in 1992. The ISD’s main function was
the “policing of unrest through proactive (preventive)
and reactive measures and the prevention of crime in
unrest-plagued areas”.8 It comprised 36 Internal
Stability Units that were deployed in ten regions.9
The Goldstone Commission in the meantime had
come up with several recommendations for the
President with regard to steps to prevent violence and
intimidation: 
• deploying an effective police presence in local 
communities; 
• utilising the new division of Internal Security to 
counter violence; 
• taking urgent steps to prohibit the carrying of 
dangerous weapons in public; and
• improving the relationship between the police 
and local communities.10
The Goldstone Commission also recognised the
necessity to legislate public gatherings, given the
forthcoming democratic elections. The outcome was
the Regulations of Gatherings Act 205 of 1993. The
Act aims “to regulate the holding of public
gatherings and demonstrations at certain places; and
to provide for matters connected herewith”.11 The
basic premise of the Act is that every person has a
right to peaceful participation in gatherings – with
the protection of the police. This was a significant
step for public policing in South Africa.
In the meantime the ISD had become very unpopular
and controversial due to its paramilitary manner; to
the extent that critics began calling for the
demilitarisation of the units.12 According to Ngubeni
and Rakgoadi, the powers and functions of the ISUs
were so broad that the police were implicated in
cases around the abuse of power (through using their
discretionary powers), misconduct, and intimidation
of community members.13
Post 1994: Public order policing takes shape
After 1994 a new approach was needed to policing
in South Africa – one that would serve the new
government and the people. Thus began the
transformation of the police from a ‘force’ into a
‘service’ that would protect the rights of all South
Africans to equality, dignity, freedom and security, as
entrenched in the Constitution.14 These were qualities
notably lacking in South African policing. 
Part of the transformation process entailed bringing
the SAPS in line with international policing
standards. Fortunately, substantial financial as well as
technical assistance was made available from several
countries for this purpose. This helped in developing
a ‘restructuring strategy’ for the SAPS, and especially
the ISD. In the case of public order policing, the
restructuring process was far-reaching and entailed
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reselecting and retraining members within a two-year
period, shrinking the public order component from
10,000 to 7,000 members, and most challenging of
all, attempting a mindset change among members
who were accustomed only to repressive methods of
policing. The end of 1995 saw the ISD and the Riot
Control Units of the so-called homeland police
merge under the new SAPS. 
In 1997, a SAPS policy document was introduced
which emphasised crowd management as opposed to
crowd control. The goals of the public order police
as set out in the document are precise and simple:
• to establish standardised procedures in the SAPS 
to manage crowds in such a way that these
conform to democratic values and accepted
international standards;
• to install an approach in POP, concurrent with 
SAPS values, of acting at all times in a
professional, acceptable and an effective manner,
in a way that is community orientated and to be
accountable for every action – based on certain
constitutional principles;
• to accomplish ideals for crowd management 
situations – relating to life, property, citizen
satisfaction of police and feelings of safety at
gatherings, and risks to SAPS personnel;
• to perform all tasks effectively and efficiently.15
Also detailed in the document are the ‘principles of
intervention’ that should govern crowd management.
This section deals with the legal aspects, the
situational appropriateness of the gathering, the
optimisation of equipment and personnel, and the
proportionality of the means of force to be used. The
document also discusses preparation for operations,
command and control, and coordinating and
operational committees. Also covered are the use of
force, the role of the media, the role of the South
African National Defence Force (SANDF), traffic
departments and other emergency services.
After some debate, the policy was eventually adapted
into Standing Order 262 on Crowd Management
during Gatherings and Demonstrations, applicable to
all operational members of the SAPS.16 The purpose
of the Standing Order, introduced in 2002, is “to
regulate crowd management during gatherings and
demonstrations in accordance with the democratic
principles of the Constitution and acceptable
international standards”.17 The Order contains much
about community partnerships and communication
with the public, signifying the police’s move
towards a more community-oriented approach. 
From ‘public order’ to ‘crime combating’
SAPS management first considered the
transformation of the public order units into Area
Crime Combating Units (ACCUs) in 2001. This
implied a role reversal for the units, with their
primary focus becoming crime combating and
prevention rather than public order and crowd
management. 
The decision to review the units’ mandate and form
the ACCUs was based on the decrease in the
number of public protests with the demise of
apartheid and the inception of the new government;
and the new Public Finance Management Act 1 of
1999, which demanded ‘value for money’
budgeting.18 All this came at a time when crime
levels were increasing, and the SAPS was in search
of more resources in line with its new National
Crime Combating Strategy (NCCS).
The NCCS was launched in 2000 as a “high
density, cordon, search and seizure operation to
combat crime in hot-spots most affected by
crime”.
19
Its principal innovation was a rigorous
focus of police attention on the 140-odd police
stations in which half of all crime in South Africa is
recorded. On 13 June 2002 the Minister of Safety
and Security, Charles Nqakula, stated: 
All POP units are being transformed into
ACCUs that will conduct intelligence-driven
operations that require high force levels.
Examples of these will be parallel
roadblocks on highways and secondary
routes, and cordon and search operations.
This is intended to deal with bank robberies,
cash in transit heists and the hijacking of
vehicles, as well as taxi and gang violence.20
While on the face of it the formation of the ACCUs
appears to have diminished the main purpose of the
specialised public order policing unit, a counter
argument is that the change makes financial and
At national level, the ACCUs fall under the
divisional commissioner of operational response
services, who provides national strategic direction
to maintain public order. The office also develops,
monitors and evaluates national standards, policy
and procedures.23
In essence, this means that SAPS head office
provides the strategic direction for public order
policing, while the provincial departments deal
with policy, standards and monitoring. It is the area
level that arguably matters the most because this is
where the functioning and day-to-day activities of
the ACCUs are handled. 
Selection and training of members
ACCU commanders are selected by the responsible
officers at national and provincial levels. The
members of the units are selected at provincial and
area level, together with the area commander of the
ACCU. Table 1 illustrates the numbers of ACCU
members based in each province.
Table 1: Number of operational ACCU members,
February 200624
Gauteng 1,695  
Kwazulu-Natal 1,255  
Eastern Cape                       789  
North West 653  
Western Cape 610  
Free State 537  
Limpopo  399  
Mpumalanga     275  
Northern Cape 114  
Head office, Pretoria 3  
Total   6,330  
Source: SAPS Operational Response Services,
Pretoria
Training policies are developed at the national
office. In-service training is organised at provincial
level and conducted by a trainer allocated to each
ACCU at area level. Potential ACCU members have
to undergo in-service training in crowd
management techniques and tactical intervention to
ensure that they have the required skills. All
operational members have to undergo in-service
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operational sense, given the shortage of capacity
within the police and the escalating crime problem
facing the country at the time.21
Roles and responsibilities of ACCUs
The document establishing the ACCUs determines
their roles and functions within the various levels of
government. Its goal is “to maintain public order by
combating serious and violent crime, policing public
gatherings, rendering specialised operational support
to other units/components/divisions and ensuring
effective information management”.22
Before 1994 the public order units were centralised,
with orders and instructions coming from police
headquarters in Pretoria. After 1994 the units were
decentralised to provincial level. With the
establishment of the ACCUs, the units have been
decentralised even further to area level, although they
can be deployed on an area, cross-area, and
provincial basis. 
Command and control
Command and control of the units is delegated to
area level and is coordinated by the ACCU
commander who reports to the deputy area
commissioner responsible for operations and
uniformed policing. Public order policing
responsibilities at area level include: 
• ensuring the effective and efficient functioning of 
the unit in terms of capability, capacity, skills and
resources; 
• ensuring that ACCU members are deployed in 
accordance with area priorities; 
• ensuring an effective information gathering 
process that focuses on serious and violent crimes
on a continuous basis; 
• providing all support services (finance, logistics 
and human resource management); and 
• ensuring that regular evaluations are conducted.
At provincial level, the head of operational response
services is responsible for developing ACCU policies,
procedures and standards, including the
implementation, monitoring and evaluation thereof.
While day-to-day deployment is controlled at area
level, the provincial commissioner can instruct on any
provincial operations relating to public order policing. 
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training annually in order to maintain high standards
and keep up with current tactical developments. 
ACCU members and their equipment also have to be
continually assessed by head office to ensure that
they are operationally competent. The document
establishing the ACCU provides guidelines for the
implementation and evaluation of ACCUs. In terms of
evaluations, the ACCU commander must conduct at
least one inspection every month and at least three
detailed inspections annually.25
Key operational issues 
Planning for ACCU operations is based on the
information gathered by the Area Crime Combating
Forum. After relevant crime information has been
analysed and requests from police stations for
upcoming crime combating operations reviewed,
operational plans are drawn up. 
Although this process allows for ACCUs to participate
in crime combating operations, their function is not to
supplement stations with additional personnel for
day-to-day activities. The ACCU document is clear on
this: “The aim of these units is to participate in
planned intelligence-driven, crime-combating
operations in support of stations”.
26
The above discussion has shown that the necessary
policies on ACCU training, equipment, and
operations are in place. But the key question is
whether these policies are being correctly
implemented. One of the concerns is that the gradual
decentralisation of control over public order policing
has resulted in members not being appropriately
trained and equipped. Whereas in the past the
national division had a hands-on approach to public
order policing in the country, the formation of the
ACCUs means that police at area level are now
responsible for the success of the units. 
An even greater concern relates to command and
control of members during crowd situations. This has,
since the formation of the ACCUs, been complicated
by the fact that ACCU members have to execute their
functions in cooperation with station-level officials
who lack specialised training in public order policing.
This is likely to result in injuries and fatalities among
members of the public during highly volatile
situations, as evidenced by the Ellis Park soccer
disaster of 200227 and the Harrismith municipal
protest of 2005.28
At Ellis Park 43 supporters died and 158 were injured
when chaos erupted at a soccer match at the
stadium. A commission of inquiry was set up to
investigate the reasons behind the disaster. The
commission’s report listed 14 reasons for the tragedy
– among them the “slow reaction” of the public order
police, and a “gaseous irritant” teargas used by these
police.29 
In Harrismith a 17-year-old boy died after police
opened fire to disperse a protesting crowd on the N3
highway. Twenty youths were shot with birdshot and
buckshot. Video footage shows that the police
opened fire indiscriminately on demonstrators as they
slowly crossed the N3 highway and then continued
firing at them as they fled for cover. No report by the
Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD) or the
police has yet been released on the incident.30
Can the ACCU deliver?
Great strides have been made with regard to the
crowd management unit of the police since 1994.
However, whether the more recent changes have
been for the benefit of public order policing remains
to be seen. The key question now is whether the
SAPS can still effectively respond to and manage
volatile crowd situations. 
While the most recent ACCU document on crowd
management may be well intentioned, it is not clear
that implementation is going according to plan.
Responsibility for the effective functioning of the
units ultimately rests with police management at area
level. These officers must ensure that ACCU
members have regular training in crowd
management, that equipment is upgraded and kept
relevant, and that morale and fitness levels remain
high.
Even if this is achieved, a broader question relates to
the fact that crime prevention has become the units’
primary activity. Already the effects of neglecting the
crowd management function and relying too heavily
on ordinary police officials for public order policing,
can be seen in the poor handling of recent public
events. 
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One of the reasons cited for making crime
prevention the units’ primary function was the
decrease in the number of public marches and
demonstrations. However, this trend is changing.
Public protest is on the increase again in South
Africa given the problems of poverty and poor
service delivery, especially at local government
level. In the last few years there has been an
upsurge of community dissatisfaction over
municipal service delivery, with people protesting
shortages of housing, lack of sanitation, and water
and electricity. Other issues such as Metrorail’s
transport problems,31 have also led to increased
incidences of public protest. 
The Harrismith and Metrorail incidents are two
among many that indicate the need for 
interventions by specially trained and experienced
public order policing units. Structured as they are
currently, there is a danger that the units will be
deprived of their specialist abilities. Perhaps the
most imminent challenge in this regard is the soccer
World Cup in 2010.32 ACCU members will have to
be trained to deal with soccer hooliganism and
related security issues. A fitness standard for
operations has to be established, and given that the
current average age of a SAPS ACCU member is 35
years,33 and that the World Cup is still four years
away, the age policy of the units has to be revisited
by area commissioners. 
The changes to public order policing in South Africa
over the past 40 years have been necessary and
warranted, given the shift in the country’s politics
and legal framework. Police management has also
responded to the challenges facing the post-1994
society by adjusting the structure and mandate of
the public order policing units. However, given the
increase in public protest and rioting in the last few
years, it is likely that the current capacity and
effectiveness of the ACCUs will need to be revisited. 
Endnotes
1 J Rauch and D Storey, The Policing of Public
Gatherings and Demonstrations in South Africa 1960 –
1994, Centre for the Study of Violence and
Reconciliation, Johannesburg, 1998,
<http://www.csvr.org.za/papers.papjrds>, p 1. 
2 The methodology for this paper was mainly desktop 
research in addition to interviews with a few
stakeholders.
3 J Rauch and D Storey, op cit, p 3. 
4 National Peace Accord, <http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/ 
services/cds/agreements/pdf/sa4.pdf>, p1.
5 Ibid, pp 26-32.
6 Ibid, pp 26-27.
7 Ibid, pp 27-28.
8 D Meyer, The South African experience in dealing 
with communal violence, African Security Review
8(1), Institute for Security Studies, 1999,
<http://www.iss.org.co.za/pubs/ASR/8no1/The
SouthAfrican exp.html> p 7.
9 Ibid, p 7.
10 National Peace Accord, p 6.
11 Government of SA, Regulation of Gathering Act 205 of 
1993.
12 See paper by K Ngubeni and S Rakgoadi, 
Transforming the Internal Stability Unit, 1995,
<http://www.csvr.org.za/articles/artknsr.htm>, pp 1-2. 
13 Ibid, p 2.
14 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
chapter 2, p 7.
15 SAPS, Approved Crowd Management Policy: Public 
Order Police (POP), 1997, p 5. 
16 Telephonic interview with Supt V Day, 11 November 
2005.
17 SAPS Standing Order 262 on Crowd Management 
during Gatherings and Demonstrations, p 1.
18 SAPS Policy: Division: Operational Response Service: 
The Establishment and Functioning of Area Crime
Combating Units (ACCUs), 2004, p 1.
19 Nedbank ISS Crime Index 2(4), 2000, p 7.
20 Budget Vote for Safety & Security, 13 June 2002.
21 See Criminal Justice Monitor, Nedbank ISS Crime 
Index 1(4), 2000, p 1. 
22 SAPS ACCU Policy, op cit.
23 Ibid.
24 The numbers are not inclusive of civilian and support 
services personnel.
25 SAPS ACCU Policy, op cit.








30 The trial is still pending according to the National 
Director: Operational Response Services, Director
Gibson, interview on 3 March 2006.
31 Commuters set fire to a Metrorail train in Pretoria in 
2001 after trains were delayed.
<http://www.numsa.org.za//printpage.php?id=796>.
32 South Africa is the host country of this event in 2010.
33 Interview with Supt V Day, 28 February 2005.
